13 Japan, East Asian regionalism and the politics of human security

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Introduction

The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan announced that they would seek to build an 'East Asian community' in their Special Summit held in Tokyo in December 2003 (ASEAN and Japan, 2003a). This announcement cemented the two parties' cordial relations, and demonstrated the rise of regionalism in East Asia.[1] The notion of East Asia, encompassing Northeast and Southeast Asia, has been under the spotlight in recent years. The development of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), participated in by the members of ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea, has attracted much attention. The first summit meeting of the APT was held in November 1997, and at the second meeting, in December 1998, the leaders agreed to regularize the event. What can be regarded as an East Asian institution is, however, a web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements placed within the framework of the APT. When the ASEAN members hold their annual summit meeting, they also host an East Asian meeting, inviting the three Northeast Asian countries – Japan, China and South Korea – known as 'ASEAN Plus Three'. They also hold separate meetings with each of these three countries, known as 'ASEAN Plus One'. Furthermore, the three Northeast Asian countries meet among themselves as well. In addition, within the framework of the APT, not only annual summit meetings but also ministerial ones in various areas are convened at different times of the year. It should be mentioned that the APT, the core of these meeting arrangements, is not an international organization established on the basis of a treaty. It is, rather, an arena within which participants put forward their international initiatives and agendas for regional cooperation.

Given the backdrop of these trends in East Asian regional institutional development, this chapter is mainly concerned with the manner in which the governance of economic security has unfolded at the East Asian regional level, and explores the ways in which economic security issues have been addressed through East Asian regional cooperation. What is notable about East Asian cooperation is that a major economic power, Japan, is involved. Japan is the largest economy in East Asia, and its activities may have a significant impact on economic security issues in the region. Thus, this chapter is interested in the role of Japan in East Asian cooperation, and especially its contribution to the economic security of Southeast Asian countries in the region.

Helen Nesadurai points out in Chapter 1 that the domestic dimension is an essential aspect of economic security. She argues that for many countries in the developing world, sustaining a particular level of growth *and* socio-economic development is critical for maintaining social cohesion and the integrity of the state. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s demonstrated the plausibility of such a claim. For the Southeast Asian countries that were severely damaged by this crisis, many of which are still engaged in the process of economic development, economic security is a crucial concern. It is in this context that this chapter explores the impact of Japanese diplomacy on East Asian regionalism more generally, and on the economic security of the Southeast Asian countries in particular. The central claim of this chapter is simply that Japan plays an important role in the development of East Asian regionalism and in the governance of economic security at the East Asian regional level. Yet such a simple claim encompasses many issues, and it is these issues that constitute the focus of discussion in this chapter.

To summarize, this chapter argues that there is an identity gap between Japan and ASEAN, the two engines of East Asian regionalism. While the former identifies itself as a member of the advanced industrialized democracies, this identity has not been shared by the Southeast Asian countries. The common identity of these countries as ASEAN is based on their own diplomatic principles, associated with the ASEAN Way. This has led to differences between the Southeast Asian states on the one hand, and Japan on the other hand, over who participates in East Asian regional cooperation, the agendas to be pursued and the manner in which these agendas are pursued. This 'identity gap' assumes especial significance in the context of human security, a key plank of Japan's foreign policy. Japan's pursuit of human security agendas in Southeast Asia had the potential to cause tension between the two parties, since the aspect of human security that emphasizes people's 'freedom from fear' is a sensitive issue in Southeast Asia, owing to its close relationship with human rights and democracy. Japan has, however, limited its means of pursuing human security to offers of official development assistance (ODA), effectively concentrating on the 'freedom from want' aspect of human security. This sits better with Southeast Asian governments. While Japan sees itself as an advanced industrialized democracy, its self-identification as a part of Asia has led it to be sympathetic to the special concerns of its regional neighbours regarding state sovereignty. This accommodation, this chapter suggests, is the key to the future consolidation of East Asian regionalism.

The first part of the chapter investigates the impact of Japanese diplomacy on the economic security of Southeast Asian countries by studying the overall development of East Asian cooperation. The concordant relations between ASEAN and Japan are explored. Next, the chapter considers some potential problems in these two parties' joint efforts to promote East Asian regionalism. Following this, the chapter focuses on one key issue resulting from the ideational difference between ASEAN and Japan: the latter's pursuit of human security agendas. In principle, the pursuit of such agendas contributes to economic security; however, in Southeast Asia, human security is a sensitive issue for governments, and Japan's activities in this area may cause tension. Thus, the study goes on to explore

the implications of Japan's human security diplomacy for the economic security of the Southeast Asian countries. In the concluding section, broader issues of governance are discussed, and the role of Japan in East Asian cooperation is identified.

ASEAN–Japan concordance: promoting East Asian regionalism

Japan and ASEAN have been the engines of East Asian regionalism. What can be regarded as an East Asian institution was constructed and has been strengthened through the development of cooperation between these two parties. Japan's contribution to the economic security of the Southeast Asian countries may be understood in terms of the development of a regional institution in East Asia, within which Japan carried out various support measures after the onset of the Asian financial crisis.

It was in the mid-1990s that East Asian regionalism began to develop. A plan for a summit meeting between Asia and Europe facilitated East Asian cooperation (Maswood, 2001: 9; Webber, 2001: 357). ASEAN and the European Union agreed that the first meeting – which would later be named the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) – be held in March 1996, and the Asian line-up was left to ASEAN to decide (*The Straits Times*, 5 May 1995: 1). ASEAN decided to invite the three Northeast Asian countries – Japan, China and South Korea – to attend the meeting. Then, in the second half of 1995 and early 1996, several meetings among these four parties, at the senior official and ministerial levels, were held to prepare for the ASEM meeting (Yamakage, 2001: 66–67).

Another important factor which facilitated East Asian regional cooperation was Japan's intention to strengthen its relations with ASEAN countries. These countries were important economic partners for Japan; moreover, the importance of ASEAN had become significant in political terms as well. At this time, for Tokyo, its relations with Beijing were an important part of the political agenda. The fact that a region-wide security dialogue was initiated by ASEAN in the early 1990s made Japan reconsider the importance of the Southeast Asian association. The ASEAN Regional Forum, a multilateral framework involving China, was established within the framework provided by ASEAN. For Japan, stronger relations with ASEAN could lead to wider East Asian cooperation.

With the aim of strengthening Japan's relations with ASEAN, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore in January 1997, the year in which ASEAN celebrated its thirtieth anniversary. In these countries, he proposed that summit meetings be held between ASEAN and Japan on a regular annual basis (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [hereafter, MOFA Japan], 1997). The ASEAN countries welcomed Hashimoto's proposal in principle (*Nikkei Shimbun* [hereafter, *Nikkei*], 20 January 1997: 8). Yet they sought even broader regional cooperation. In the summer, they decided to invite not only Japan but also China and South Korea to their summit meeting scheduled to be held in Kuala Lumpur in December of that year (ASEAN, 1997).

Soon after the first summit meeting at the East Asian regional level was scheduled, the Asian financial crisis broke out. The crisis dealt a serious blow to the economic security of countries in the region. Retrospectively, it can be said that East Asian regionalism developed dramatically through Japan and ASEAN's joint efforts to deal with this major economic security challenge. Several weeks after the start of the crisis in July 1997, Japan sought to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Yet the AMF plan was not implemented, because of opposition from the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Recovery measures were carried out within the framework of the latter, to which Japan made financial contributions. However, as the situation showed no significant sign of improvement, a sense of frustration and resentment began to grow in Asia against the Washington-sponsored IMF. Then Japan put forward its own initiative in October 1998: the New Miyazawa Initiative. This initiative included up to US$30 billion in financial support, based on bilateral arrangements with Asian countries. The plan was emphasized by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi during his policy initiative speech, which he delivered before attending the APT meeting in Hanoi in December 1998. In the speech, he acknowledged the 'ever-increasing economic interdependence' between Japan and other Asian countries (MOFA Japan, 1998). In 1998, for example, Japan's exports to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines had decreased by 32 per cent from the previous year (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan, 1999: 63). The recovery of the Asian economies was clearly essential to the Japanese economy.

At the APT meeting in Manila in November 1999, the East Asian leaders issued their 'Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation'. Their statement underscored the prominence of the notion of East Asia, as shown in expressions such as 'interaction', 'closer linkages', 'people' and 'mutual understanding' in East Asia (ASEAN, 1999). One of the most remarkable achievements of the APT has been an agreement reached in May 2000 at the finance ministers' meeting to build a regional network of currency swap agreements, called the Chiang Mai Initiative. Significantly, the agreement extended ASEAN's currency swap network to Japan, which holds a large amount of foreign currency reserves. The previous swap agreement among ASEAN countries had been far from adequate (Soesastro, 1998: 375). What developed after the Chiang Mai meeting was a regional mechanism aimed at preventing another crisis. This mechanism was aimed at deterring speculative attacks by providing an international liquidity mechanism to respond to such attacks, and should be seen as one of the central pillars of economic security governance in East Asia.[2]

In addition to the economic area, the significance of the APT should also be recognized in the political/security field. Regional stability is a prerequisite for any cooperative initiatives, including those for economic security, and the APT serves as an arena for a security dialogue aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trust. In the 1999 joint statement, the leaders expressed their commitment to promote not only monetary and financial cooperation, but also security dialogue and other cooperative agendas (ASEAN, 1999). During the 1999 meeting, they devoted much time to discussing security issues, such as the Korean Peninsula

problem and Indonesia's destabilization resulting from the financial crisis. At this time, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea were not addressed. Nonetheless, East Asian cooperation developed thereafter, and in November 2002, ASEAN and Beijing signed the 'Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea', a political document stipulating a code of conduct in this area (ASEAN and People's Republic of China, 2002). This should be regarded as another achievement of cooperative efforts in East Asia.

East Asian regionalism has emerged through the development of cordial relations between ASEAN and Japan, as demonstrated above. This of course does not mean that the roles of other countries, in particular China, are unimportant. Yet Beijing's active involvement in East Asian regionalism has begun only in recent years. It is ASEAN and Japan that have led regional cooperation since the mid-1990s. The announcement at the ASEAN–Japan Special Summit in Tokyo in December 2003 that they would seek to build an East Asian community is significant in this regard. Japan's commitment to East Asian cooperation has promoted the construction of the first East Asian institution, and Tokyo's activities have contributed to regional efforts to address the economic security issues associated with the financial crisis. Nevertheless, there are some potential problems in their joint effort to promote East Asian cooperation. Such problems concern the notion of East Asia itself.

ASEAN–Japan discord: problematising an East Asian identity?

Who are the East Asians? What sort of agendas should be pursued through East Asian cooperation, and in what way should those agendas be pursued? The answers to these questions from ASEAN and from Japan may differ. The discord between the two parties concerns issues of identity. In an East Asian community, which they intend to construct, members should be able to share a 'we-feeling' or a sense of 'we-ness' (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957). A sense of community involves a common identity as members of East Asia. However, there is an identity gap between the two engines of East Asian regionalism.

Japan is undoubtedly an Asian country in a geographical sense, and shares much with its Asian neighbours in historical and economic terms; nonetheless, Tokyo identifies itself as a member of the advanced industrialized democracies, which share liberal values such as freedom, human rights, democracy and a market economy. Such an identity has been expressed in various diplomatic documents, including Japan's *Diplomatic Bluebook* 2001, the first issue of the new century. The first page of this book states, 'The curtain has been raised on the 21st century. . . . As a principal member of the advanced industrialized democracies . . . Japan is being called on to meet its global responsibilities' (MOFA Japan, 2001a: 1).

However, Tokyo's key partners in East Asian cooperation, the ASEAN countries, do not share such an identity with Japan and with other advanced industrialized democracies. The Southeast Asian countries hold a set of unique diplomatic principles associated with the so-called ASEAN Way of diplomacy, as is elaborated on later in the chapter. They have developed these principles through their

interaction over decades, and their common identity as ASEAN has been constructed upon these principles (Khong, 1997; Acharya, 1998: 207–214; 2001a: 26–28, 71, 202; Bessho, 1999: chapter 3). Such an identity gap between Japan and ASEAN may be a source of discord, which may be problematic for the development of East Asian regionalism and the creation of a community.

ASEAN and Japan appear to have different understandings of the notion of East Asia and that of an East Asian community. When Tokyo talks about an East Asian community, its perspective encompasses Australia and New Zealand, which are also advanced industrialized democracies. The Japanese perspective was expressed in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's speech in Singapore in January 2002, in which Japan for the first time articulated its desire to develop a community in East Asia:

> Our goal should be the creation of a 'community'. . . . The first step is to make the best use of the framework of ASEAN+3. . . . I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.
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> (MOFA Japan, 2002a)

The Japanese idea of starting a community-building process on the basis of the APT is shared by ASEAN. However, the question of whether Australia and New Zealand should be considered members of East Asia remains controversial. Hence, the 'Tokyo Declaration', issued at the ASEAN–Japan Special Summit in December 2003, was vague on this point. With regard to the plan for an East Asian community, the leaders of the two parties could not specify the geographical scope of such a community. The declaration ambiguously stated that the APT process was an 'important channel to promote cooperation', while maintaining that a community should be 'outward looking' (ASEAN and Japan, 2003a).

Indeed, the lack of shared understanding between the two parties has been apparent for several years. In 1995, they disagreed over which countries should represent 'Asia' in the summit between Asia and Europe, scheduled for the following year. Tokyo held that Australia and New Zealand should take part. However, as the initiator of the summit, ASEAN decided to invite only the three Northeast Asian countries – Japan, China and South Korea – and suggested that the association might hold the summit without Japan if the latter insisted on the participation of Canberra and Wellington (Jiji Press, 1995).

Japan's concern with Australia and New Zealand cannot be understood purely in security and economic terms. In the security area, the levels of interdependence between Japan and these two countries are by no means high. In the economic field, it is difficult to claim that Tokyo has special relations with them while other Asian countries do not. Take, for example, the volume of trade with Australia as a percentage of total volume of trade: Indonesia's figures are higher than those of Japan, in both exports and imports. The export figures of Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are higher than that of Japan, while their import figures are lower. Although the Philippines' figures for both exports and imports are lower than those

of Japan, it can be said that, overall, it is not the case that Japan's relationship with Canberra is an exceptional one (International Monetary Fund, 2002).

Moreover, there may be discord between ASEAN and Japan over questions of what sort of cooperative agendas should be pursued, and the way in which such agendas should be pursued. A comment by an anonymous ASEAN official at the APT in October 2003 aptly summarizes the potential problems. The official noted that although Japan puts forward the largest number of proposals among the APT participants, there was a gap between its proposals and what ASEAN would like to pursue (*Mainichi Shimbun*, 8 October 2003: 7). To be sure, ASEAN is not a monolithic entity, and disagreements between its members often arise. Yet within the association, there is a common understanding that decisions should be made on a consensual basis, and ASEAN should pursue common policies in its dealings with external powers. However, in the case of ASEAN–Japan relations, there is no common understanding in this regard, and thus things may simply go wrong.

The APT meeting in Brunei in November 2001 is a case in point. At this meeting, which was held a few months after the September 11 attack in the United States, the lack of unity between ASEAN and Japan was apparent in the treatment of issues related to terrorism. At the preparatory stage of the meeting, Japan actively sought an anti-terrorism declaration to be adopted by the participants (*Asahi Shimbun*, 6 November 2001: 3). For Japan, the attack against the United States, another representative of the advanced industrialized democracies, was undoubtedly a crucial global issue, and Japan believed that some kind of action should be taken by East Asians as well. Nonetheless, Tokyo's efforts bore no fruit, owing to the lack of a common understanding of terrorism issues between Japan and ASEAN.

The ASEAN members did not intend to discuss these issues with Japan in depth. At the APT meeting, Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, spent most of his allocated time discussing these issues, exploring the possibilities of international cooperation against terrorism; however, few Asian leaders joined the discussion (ibid.; *Nikkei*, 6 Nov 2001: 2). What ASEAN members did instead was to address terrorism issues within the Southeast Asian association. At the ASEAN summit, which was held before the APT, the Southeast Asian countries issued their own anti-terrorism declaration, which reflected their particular concern over attributing terrorism to religious and racial factors (ASEAN, 2001). Subsequently, ASEAN told Tokyo, which was seeking an APT declaration, that there was no need to issue a separate one (*Nikkei*, 6 November 2001: 2).

This kind of discord between ASEAN and Japan over the question of agendas in East Asian cooperation may have some implications for economic security. Issues associated with the concept of 'human security' are significant in this regard. The rest of this chapter focuses on the case of human security issues.

The human security controversy

Human security is a global agenda pursued in the United Nations (UN) by various agencies and actors, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the

UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The 1994 *Human Development Report* of the UNDP elaborated on this concept. According to the UNDP, human security is 'people-centred' and 'concerned with how people live and breathe in a society'. There are two major components of human security: freedom from *fear* and freedom from *want*. Thus, human security concerns how freely people exercise their many choices, whether they live in conflict or in peace, and how much access they have to market and social opportunities (1994: 23–24; 1995: 229–230).

Economic security, then, is one of the main components of human security, along with other aspects such as food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP, 1994: chapter 2; 1995). The concept of economic security should not be conflated with that of human security. Yet the latter covers people's right to economic resources. The distinction between these two concepts concerns their scope, not the principle behind them. Given that human security is a broad concept that encompasses economic security, efforts to enhance human security should in principle contribute to economic security. However, in Asia such efforts may entail a set of problems.

The principles of human security, emphasizing people's freedom from fear and want, resonate well with Japan's political values and identity. Its *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001* emphasizes the notions of 'freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights' as a set of values and institutions to which Japan and other advanced industrialized democracies adhere (MOFA Japan, 2001a: 2). It is said that when new ideas resonate well with existing ones, the former can be promoted smoothly and effectively (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 204–205; Checkel, 1999; Bernstein, 2000). Thus, Japan has been one of the strongest proponents of human security agendas in the international sphere. It has been attentive to the discourse of human security in the global setting, as its discussion of human security customarily focuses on the activities of the UN (MOFA Japan, 2001b; 2001c: 2–3). The UNDP encouraged the international community to endorse the 'concept of human security as the key challenge for the 21st century' (1994: 39; 1995: 236). Reflecting on such discourse, the diplomatic bluebook mentioned above notes that 'positioning human security as the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century, Japan is working to make the new century a human-centered century' (MOFA Japan, 2001a: 50).

However, for ASEAN, human security is a sensitive agenda. This is because ASEAN politics is traditionally state centred, while human security is people centred. The principles of the ASEAN Way of diplomacy include mutual respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. These principles themselves are not peculiar to Southeast Asia; however, the Southeast Asian countries' practice of these principles should be understood in the ASEAN context (Katsumata, 2003). Until the middle of the twentieth century, all the ASEAN countries with the exception of Thailand had been under colonial rule. Historical memories of a common colonial past have made all the ASEAN countries very respectful of one another's sovereignty (Katzenstein, 1997: 32). More importantly, the principle of non-interference has been fostered on the basis of the governments' belief that they should concentrate on nation-building without interference from others. In Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of

Thailand, the state came before the nation (Nathan, 1998: 547). For the post-independence governments that inherited from the colonial powers a multi-ethnic political entity with a weak economic basis, nation-building and the achievement of domestic stability were crucial tasks.

ASEAN's state-centred diplomatic style is ill suited to the pursuit of people's security. In particular, in terms of the two aspects of human security – that is, people's freedom from fear and freedom from want – issues associated with the former can be controversial in Southeast Asia. Examples of such issues include human rights, democracy and numerous problems arising from conflicts. Measures to deal with these issues may become intrusive in the political/security field. However, any form of external interference is unacceptable to the governments of the Southeast Asian states. ASEAN itself also plays little role in addressing the domestic issues of its member countries, especially in the political/security area.

Human security undoubtedly involves issues of human rights and democracy, as the UNDP notes that 'people should be able to live in a society that honours their human rights' (1994: 32; 1995: 233). The Human Security Network, initiated by Canada and Norway in the late 1990s, emphasizes these issues: 'Human security is advanced . . . by protecting and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and democratic structures' (Human Security Network, 1999). Yet, in Southeast Asia, some governments see human security as another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values (Acharya, 2001b: 1).

An even more difficult issue is the question of intervention (ibid.: 15; Anwar, 2003: 555–563). Today, some countries call for military measures in order to protect people's rights. Canada, another strong advocate of human security, goes as far as arguing that '[e]nsuring human security can involve the use of coercive measures, including sanctions and military forces' (Axworthy, 1999). Under the rubric of human security, Canada sends missions, deploys troops and carries out peacekeeping operations – or what Ottawa calls 'peace support operations' – under the auspices of international organizations such as the UN and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (see Axworthy, 1999; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, n.d.).

In Southeast Asia, the principles of human security do not resonate, although they do in Japan. Thus, the countries of Southeast Asia have not pursued human security agendas in depth. The joint communiqués of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting have not focused on such agendas. The ASEAN Concord II in 2003 put forward the concept of an 'ASEAN Security Community'. Although various security agendas, including security dialogue, approaches to conflicts and maritime security, were considered under this new concept, human security was not mentioned (ASEAN, 2003). The Asian financial crisis, which caused a pervasive sense of economic, political and social insecurity, was an event that signalled the relevance of the concept of human security (Acharya and Acharya, 2002: 329–333). Thus, after the crisis Thailand proposed that a caucus on human security issues be set up (Surin 1998). However, the Thai proposal was modified, and ASEAN decided to consider a caucus on 'social safety nets', whose focus would be on social and economic issues, including poverty, disease and illiteracy (*The Nation*, 29 July

1998). This idea was incorporated into the activities of the ASEAN Foundation (Soesastro, 1998: 380). Overall, it can be said that in ASEAN diplomacy the notion of human security has been neglected, although social and economic issues are considered important.

Given that Japan is among the strongest proponents of human security agendas while ASEAN is rather reluctant to pursue them, this could be a cause of discord between the two parties. Thus, it is worth exploring whether and in what way Japan has pursued these agendas in East Asia, while considering the implications of Japan's diplomacy for the economic security of the Southeast Asian countries.

Japan in Asia: human security and economic security

Japan has been pursuing human security agendas in Southeast Asia for several years. Indeed, this is the region where Tokyo's human security diplomacy first started. Yet despite the sensitivity of the issue, Japan's diplomacy has not caused any tension or discord. Rather, the Southeast Asian countries welcome Japan's activities, which contribute to the enhancement of their economic security. In this respect, it should be emphasized that Japanese human rights diplomacy mainly addresses issues concerning people's freedom from want, rather than freedom from fear.

Remarkably, Tokyo has limited its means of pursuing human security to the offering of its official development assistance (ODA), and concentrated on areas related to development, such as poverty, education, health and the environment (MOFA Japan, 2003a: 84, 149).[3] Its aim is to develop local communities and to enhance individuals' abilities. For example, under the rubric of human security, Tokyo's ODA is used to reduce poverty, develop local economies, enhance agricultural infrastructures, build schools and hospitals, as well as to provide education for children and vocational training for adults. Japan's efforts in these areas would enhance the economic security of recipient countries, in particular, if the domestic dimension of economic security were being emphasized.

Moreover, in Japan's human security policies based on its ODA, issues that are deemed to be sensitive in Southeast Asia, such as human rights and democracy, are not addressed extensively. Tokyo seems to have avoided linking these issues to its human security policies. Japan's ODA White Paper 2002 mentions areas on which it intends to focus in its human security assistance, including poverty, education, medical care and healthcare generally, water and sanitation, the environment and the like. Issues of human rights and democracy are not raised here (ibid.: 84, 149, 634).[4] Tokyo's pursuit of human security agendas, unlike Canada's, does not involve any intrusive measures in the political/security field. If issues related to conflicts were to be addressed, Tokyo's main focus would be on post-conflict rehabilitation and redevelopment, instead of the prevention and resolution of conflicts, which might entail political and or military measures. It is worth noting that human security is discussed mainly in Japan's ODA White Papers, and to a limited extent in its Diplomatic Bluebooks. In its Defence White Papers, the phrase 'human security' hardly appears (ibid.; MOFA Japan, 2002b; Japan Defense Agency, 2002).

Why has Japan's focus been limited to the development area? This is because, while Japan sees itself as a member of the advanced industrialised democracies, it also identifies itself as belonging to Asia, and thus has been sympathetic to the special concern of its fellow countries over state sovereignty. According to the director-general of the Multilateral Cooperation Department of Japan's Foreign Ministry, Hideaki Ueda, the Japanese government does not support the idea of intervention under the rubric of human security, given that there are many developing countries that hold to a traditional conception of sovereignty. Ueda highlights his government's dialogue with developing countries in which the latter expressed their concern that developed countries might intervene in their domestic affairs under the pretext of human security. Furthermore, he notes that Japan's approach in its Asian diplomacy is based not on pressure, but on dialogue (Ueda, 2000: 71–73). Such discourse on the part of Japanese officials is common. Another high-ranking official of the same department emphasizes the concerns on the part of developing countries over the developed countries' attempts to interfere and impose their own values through human security activities (Minami, *et al.*, 2003: 28).

Japan's concern for Asian countries is based on its identity as a part of Asia. Such an identity has long been embraced by the Japanese, as reflected in the discourse of its political leaders. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda delivered a speech in Manila in 1977 in which he proposed the so-called Fukuda doctrine. He noted that both Japan and the Southeast Asian countries are members of Asia, and should foster 'heart-to-heart' relations (MOFA Japan, 1977).[5] Having pursued such cordial relations with other Asian countries, Japan has been sensitive to those countries' anxiety over human security issues. For Japan, any failure to build such relations would result in a sense of alienation.

One might disagree with the above claim and argue that Tokyo's concern for these countries merely reflects the pursuit of its economic interests through ODA. It is true that critics are prone to view economic assistance from developed countries as an attempt to expand their markets or to secure sources of energy. However, such criticism mainly applies to assistance for infrastructure and energy projects. In Japan's human security ODA, with its aim of reducing poverty and enhancing education and healthcare, no substantial economic stakes are involved. Hence, it is hard to explain Japan's special concern for Asian countries without making reference to its identity as a part of Asia.[6] In addition, others might even deny the claim that Japan is attentive to the Asian countries' anxiety, and attribute Japan's non-intrusive approach to its pacifist constitution and norms, which discourage active diplomacy in the political/military area. However, since the early 1990s Japan's diplomacy has actually become active in these areas. Tokyo has sought to make greater international contributions in the political/security area.[7] Yet with respect to the human security issues deemed to be sensitive in Southeast Asia, Japan has limited its focus to the development area. This should be understood in terms of Japan's concern for its fellow Asian countries, the basis of which is a common identity as Asians. In sum, with regard to human security, Japan's multiple identities have served to mitigate the potential negative consequences of its identity gap with ASEAN.

It was in the late 1990s that Japan announced its intention of advancing human security in Southeast Asia by offering ODA. This was part of Japan's efforts to assist the countries that had been affected by the economic crisis. In December 1998, when he visited Hanoi to attend the APT, Prime Minister Obuchi delivered a speech that elaborated on his policy initiatives. Obuchi stated that Japan would address human security by utilizing its ODA (MOFA Japan, 1998).

ODA has been one of the main components of Japanese foreign policy for decades, and Southeast Asia has been the priority area. Hence, it is not surprising that for all the Southeast Asian recipient countries – that is, all the ASEAN members except for Brunei and Singapore – Japan is the largest donor (MOFA Japan, 2003a: 300; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003). What is remarkable is the fact that, in recent years, Tokyo has made human security one of the core elements of its ODA policies, and extended its economic assistance to people of the developing countries, either directly or through its contribution to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. Its 'Medium-Term Policy on ODA', announced in 1999, incorporated the notion of human security. It can be said that the underlying principles of its mid-term policy address an essential element of economic security. While emphasizing its human security perspective, Tokyo maintained that it would 'provide assistance for balanced economic growth *and* social development' (MOFA Japan, 1999; emphasis added).

Japan's ODA has been extended not only to governments, but also to local communities and individuals. It aims at narrowing the gap between rich and poor (see MOFA Japan, 2003b). Such an approach has largely been welcomed by the Southeast Asian countries. The 'Tokyo Declaration' issued at the ASEAN–Japan summit noted 'the significant contribution of Japan in the area of development assistance' (ASEAN and Japan, 2003a). Even more remarkably, the 'ASEAN–Japan Plan of Action' went as far as to state that both parties will '[c]onsider jointly promoting human security through various projects including those which Japan will support through . . . the Grant Assistance for Grassroots/Human Security Projects' – that is, one element of Japan's ODA policies (ASEAN and Japan, 2003b).

Conclusions

Japanese diplomacy has had a significant impact on the development of East Asian regionalism and on the economic security of the Southeast Asian countries. The first regional institution in East Asia, centred on the ASEAN Plust Three (APT), was constructed and has been strengthened through the development of cordial relations between ASEAN and Japan. The latter's activities after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis have contributed to regional efforts to enhance economic security. Moreover, Tokyo has been able to address the domestic dimension of the Southeast Asian countries' economic security through its efforts to promote human security on the basis of its ODA policies. It has focused on the development of local communities and the enhancement of individuals' abilities in such areas as poverty, education and health.

However, there is an identity gap between the two engines of East Asian regionalism. While Japan identifies itself as a member of the advanced industrialized democracies, this identity has not been shared by the Southeast Asian countries. The common identity of these countries as ASEAN members is based on their own diplomatic principles. As a result, there may be disagreement between these two parties over questions of which countries should be included in the process of East Asian cooperation, what sort of agendas should be pursued in this process, and in what ways those agendas should be pursued. Yet with regard to human security, despite the sensitivity of this issue in Southeast Asia, Japan's activities have not caused any tension between the two parties. This is because Tokyo also identifies itself as a part of Asia, and thus has been sympathetic to the special concern of its fellow countries over state sovereignty. In other words, with regard to human security, Japan's multiple identities have served to mitigate the potential negative consequences of its identity gap with ASEAN.

On the basis of the study of the human security case, it can be said that the key to addressing the problem of an identity gap within the framework of East Asian cooperation is Japan's own orientation. In this regard, the direction of Japanese diplomacy is one of the key determinants of the future of regionalism in East Asia. East Asian regionalism has emerged only in recent years. The experience of the Southeast Asian countries demonstrates that the construction of a regional identity is a long process. The history of these countries' relations should be understood as their quest for a Southeast Asian identity (Acharya, 2000). This took a long time, during which countries that were politically, economically and culturally diverse have come to terms with each other's differences, and developed their common identity and diplomatic principles. As a result of their lengthy efforts, today ASEAN is seen as a community of friendly nations (Snitwongse, 1995: 520; Khong, 1997; Acharya 1998, 2001a; Bessho, 1999: chapter 3). In East Asia, although the leaders of ASEAN and Japan have recently announced their intention to form a community, regional cooperation is still at an early stage. The East Asian leaders should regard their announcement as the starting point of their quest for an East Asian identity.

Finally, it is worth considering the broader issue of governance, and identifying the position of Japan in East Asian cooperation. Achieving governance does not necessarily require a centralized authority in the form of governments or supranational organizations (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Young, 1994: 12–19). International governance is achievable through countries' efforts to create international regimes or broader cooperative arrangements covering multiple areas. Yet in East Asia, one needs to be careful not to overemphasize multilateral activities under the framework of the APT. A web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements placed within the APT is simply an arena within which participants put forward their cooperative agendas. Mechanisms for economic security at the East Asian regional level comprise a network of bilateral arrangements and a set of economic measures on a bilateral basis. The New Miyazawa Initiative emphasized Japan's bilateral financial support for Asian countries. The Chiang Mai Initiative is based on a network of bilateral currency swap agreements, and Japan's ODA policies are

not conducted through multilateral arrangements in East Asia. The development of regional mechanisms for governance is still at an early stage, and such mechanisms largely rely on various bilateral arrangements. After all, East Asian regionalism is still at an incipient stage, and a solid East Asian regional identity has not yet been constructed.

The prominence of the bilateral arrangements brings Japan to the centre stage in regional economic security efforts. It is said that Tokyo cannot assume leadership in East Asia for historical reasons, and because of its rivalry with Beijing (Webber, 2001). Nevertheless, in reality it plays a significant role on a bilateral basis. It is the biggest economic power in East Asia, as shown by the extent of its financial support to the Southeast Asian countries after the economic crisis. The amount of its ODA to these countries is the largest in the world. Moreover, the importance of Japan's role should be understood in ideational terms. Japan's own orientation, concerning its identity as a part of Asia, is the key to addressing the problem of an identity gap in East Asian regionalism. Therefore, in both economic and ideational terms the role of Japan is highly significant in the development of East Asian regionalism and in the governance of economic security.

Notes

1 In this chapter, the term 'regionalism' refers to the development of regional cooperation, which may be either formal or informal. Regional cooperation may entail the creation of a formal institution, yet it can also be based on a looser structure, involving patterns of regular meetings (see Hurrell, 1995: 38–39, 42). The notion of East Asia is an ambiguous and contested one, as is demonstrated in this chapter.

2 To be sure, the currency swap agreements are arranged in coordination with the IMF. Yet even so, they are measures offered by Asians for Asian countries.

3 With regard to Japan's efforts in this area, it has incorporated the human security perspective in its overall ODA policies. Moreover, it has strengthened its assistance measures for grassroots projects and renamed it Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects. Furthermore, it established the Trust Fund for Human Security in the United Nations in 1999, and has supported various projects within the framework of the UN (MOFA Japan, 2001c: 7).

4 It is notable in this regard that although Tokyo claims to consider the human rights conditions of recipient countries in its overall ODA policies, Japan's approach in this area is rather practical and non-confrontational (Watanabe, 2001; Lam, 2001: 122–125).

5 In addition, Japan's sense of affinity with Asia has been reflected in speeches of political leaders. See, for example, MOFA Japan (1998). For Japan's identity as a member of Asia, see also Hein and Hammond (1995) and Bessho (1999: ch. 1).

6 Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that countries may strengthen their trade and investment relations without being sensitive to each other's diplomatic concerns, as the 'Western' countries' relations with the Southeast Asian countries demonstrate.

7 For example, in June 1990 Japan hosted a meeting of four Cambodian factions in Tokyo. Thereafter, Japan's active participation in the Cambodian peace process continued, as it contributed its defence forces to the UN peacekeeping operation in 1992.

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